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Abstract  
 
This paper presents a new perspective on earnings management analyzing 
and comparing emerging European countries in the presence of 
environmental factors of developing countries. We provide empirical 
evidence on differences in the extent of earnings management across 
countries. Developing Eastern European countries experienced important 
changes. They have been in transition over the past decade, and remain 
making great strides to overcome the drag exerted by their communist 
heritage. Nevertheless, the studies on earnings management based on 
emerging economies are rare and hardly pursued due to the presence of 
institutional and regulatory differences between developed and emerging 
economies. Therefore, the present study fulfils the important gap in earnings 
management literature related to developing countries. Our results confirm 
that managers from different emerging European countries manage 
earnings differently. Additionally, we identify that there is not a sole reason 
affecting the managers’ decisions, but a significant number of circumstances 
and characteristics. Whether a firm’s environment offers more protection or 
is characterized by a higher level of development, higher foreign investments, 
it helps to limit the earnings management. In addition, when accounting and 
tax are not as strongly aligned with market approach as expected, it also 
limits the earnings management behaviour of managers. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has been the topic of multiple research papers. Practitioners and academic 
literature defined earnings management in a variety of forms using a wide range of expressions to describe it, 
as a major problems with the definition include ambiguity and immeasurability, see some of the most popular 
definition of Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000) among others.  
Academics have been also interested in the detection of earnings management proposing different 
methodology. Research studies are still concerned with the problem of measuring earnings management. 
McNichols (2000) offers important debate on it. However, literature confirms that methodology based on 
accruals is commonly used by the authors (see for example, (Beaver, Mcnichols, & Nelson, 2003; Bernard & 
Skinner, 1996; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Subramanyam, 1996)).  
Nevertheless, a key theme of the earnings management literature is to understand why managers 
manipulate earnings. This paper presents a new perspective on earnings management analyzing and 
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comparing emerging European countries in the presence of environmental factors of developing countries. 
Eastern European countries, like many other developing countries, have had instances of existence of earnings 
manipulation of financial information. This suggests that even emerging economies were long ago, introduced 
to earnings management practices. However, this has not been apparent. Most studies on managerial 
incentives for earnings management have been conducted in the US, Western European countries or Asian 
market. Very few studies took place in emerging economies like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 
Studies on earnings management based on emerging economies are rare and hardly pursued. Due to the 
presence of institutional and regulatory differences between developed and emerging economies.  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper addresses the questions of environmental circumstances and 
characteristics of firms which characterized the panorama of emerging Eastern European countries and their 
influence on existent earnings management differences among developing countries. We provide empirical 
evidence on differences in the extent of earnings management across these countries. 
Our results confirm that there is not a sole reason affecting the managers’ decisions, but a significant 
number of factors that influence Eastern European companies. These environmental circumstances and 
characteristics of firms are different among Eastern European countries. There are different levels of investor 
protection, market development, ownership concentration, board size, inflows of foreign investment, etc., 
within Eastern European countries. These differences have an important influence on managers’ decisions. 
Therefore, managers of companies from different Eastern European countries manipulate differently.  
Additionally, the results confirm that whether a firm’s environment offers more protection or is 
characterized by a higher level of development: market capitalization, higher foreign investments, it helps to 
limit the earnings management. In addition, when accounting and tax are not as strongly aligned with market 
approach as expected, it also limits the earnings management behaviour of managers. Additionally, older 
Eastern European firms, with higher ownership concentration and larger boards, present lower levels of 
earnings management. Contrary situation leads to increase of earnings management activity. Finally, we 
confirm that legal enforcement is not sufficiently developed in Eastern European countries to improve the 
quality of financial reporting and limit the existence of earnings management or at least it is not as effective as 
it should be.  
By providing direct evidence from the developing European markets we contribute to the earnings 
management literature focusing on the markets until now barely explored. As mentioned previously, studies 
on earnings management based on emerging economies are rare and hardly pursued due to the presence of 
institutional elements difficult to investigate.  
Second, our study contributes to the debate among investigators, practitioners, regulators and academics 
about the possible determinants of earnings management in developing countries. This is one of the first 
studies which try to analyze and compare emerging European countries in the presence of environmental 
factors. Therefore, we also fill in the research gap of the earnings management investigation. 
Finally, our study helps to understand how managers cope with the pressure in developing and growing 
economies, operating in companies in countries in highly competitive European markets. 
The paper comprises of five sections. In the next section we focus on the literature review on earnings 
management related to emerging European countries. Section 3 outlines the research methodology opted in 
the study. We discuss factors of the company’s environment which influence on the scope of manipulation and 
which may facilitate or limit earnings management. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the study. 
Finally, we outline the conclusion and limitations. We present some of the future possible tendencies towards 
investigation on earnings management.   
 
2. Literature Review 
It is generally perceived that incentives for earnings management are always present in managers’ daily 
activities, as managers always have reasons and possibilities to control information (see for example, (Dechow 
& Sloan, 1991; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001)). However, in some 
circumstances the level of certain incentives may decrease or increase depending on some factors which come 
from the environment where the company operates. These set of relationships and circumstances may 
stimulate the managers to earnings management; on the contrary, other set of circumstances or factors may 
significantly limit the behaviour of the managers. It is because the incentives appear from the unambiguous 
situations and decisions which managers can undertake. These decisions may derive from specific economic, 
financial, political or social interest, circumstances of the environment where the company is operating (see for 
example, (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Kasznik, 1999; Teoh, 
Welch, & Wang, 1998)).  
Consequently, regulatory bodies or characteristics of the background of the company may influence on 
managers’ decisions to opt for managing earnings. More favorable conditions may facilitate/ preserve the 
manipulation. On the other hand, more strict characteristics of the business environment may preserve or in 
some situations facilitate the manipulation. Cimini and Mechelli (2014) confirm the importance of considering 
the country characteristics when facing different issues of accounting studies. Markarian and Santalo (2010) 
add that incentives to engage in earnings management are the effect of product market competition and 
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crucially depend on the level of visibility of the firm, and on the market characteristics, among other factors. 
Environmental conditions have a significant impact on the financial reports and affect the managers’ actions 
(Zeff, 1978).  
Developing European markets experienced important changes over last decades. Robert M. Solow, 
former Nobel Memorial Prize winner in Economic Science, noted that "Western economists, don't know how 
the Eastern bloc institutions and state enterprises work or how to model an economy that is half market 
driven and half controlled by bureaucrats" (Solow, 1990) referring to an unknown tendency of Eastern 
European markets. Until the 1980’s this market was completely forgotten, as a result of the political situation 
(the bloc of communist countries and their separation from Europe).  
These developing European markets increasingly gain importance within Europe. They have been in 
transition over the past decade, and remain making great strides to overcome the drag exerted by their 
communist heritage. They have attempted to accelerate the creation of a free market system through 
privatization, by reforming the financial system, attracting large inflows of foreign capital, and by working 
towards the European Union candidacy and membership mentioned (see (Havas, 2002; Mickiewicz & 
Radosevic, 2001)). Their companies are already among the fastest-growing companies in the Europe. They 
have large potential to be tapped for further output expansion. Nevertheless, macroeconomic statistics show 
that developing Eastern European countries are still not at the same economic level as Western European 
countries. There is still important economic gap in terms of the Gross Domestic Product, unemployment, 
inflation rate, interest rate, and minimum wages, among others1. They continue to adapt to the EU model, 
through constant transformation and development. Given the economic circumstances, it could be expected 
that there are also possible differences in earnings management between Eastern and Western European 
countries. This leads us to the conclusion of the necessity and importance of investigating earnings 
management in developing Eastern European countries because the Eastern and Western European countries 
are so different; hence, earnings management can be also different.  
Additionally, surprisingly, wide earnings management literature barely explored these emerging 
European countries. Western European countries are well-investigated but we may find only few studies 
focusing on the earnings manipulation in developing European countries. (Callao, Jarne, & Wroblewski, 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c) and Wojtowicz (2015) confirm that earnings management in companies from emerging 
European countries was the subject of only several studies. Following we present existent literature on 
emerging European countries, included not only developing Eastern European countries but as well other 
rising European countries. 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) investigated developing Greek companies, and they confirmed the effect of 
audit efforts on earnings management. Swiderski, Goncharov, and Bissessur (2010) investigated whether 
public and private firms in three Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
engage in opportunistic earnings management. The results verified their hypothesis.  
Matis, Vladu, Negrea, and Sucala (2010) found that Romanian economic environment has significant 
influence on earnings management. Brzeszczyński, Gajdka, and Schabek (2011) presented results on the 
existence of earnings management based on the listed companies from Poland. Wojtowicz (2015) focused on 
the detection of any signals of earnings management to achieve zero or small positive earnings surprises in 
Polish listed companies. Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski first, investigated which earnings management accruals 
model is the most reliable model for measuring earnings management for developing market of Eastern 
European countries (Callao et al., 2017c). They also investigated whether earnings management is being 
practiced in unlisted firms from emerging Eastern European countries (Callao et al., 2017b). In their third 
research study, based on the same sample of developing Eastern European countries, they provided evidence 
in terms of the incentives which lead managers from four emerging European countries to manage earnings 
(Callao et al., 2017a). Finally, in their last study they compare four Eastern and four Western European 
countries in terms of the earnings management behaviour taking into consideration the particularities and 
differences of both markets Callao, Jarne, and Wróblewski (2018).  
Some other recent studies focus on developing countries but not from Europe. We may observe 
intensification of research papers based on the countries till now not explored, such as: Serbia (Bešlić, Bešlić, 
Jakšić, & Andrić, 2015) Jordan (Almasarwah, 2015), Kenya (Chelogoi, 2017; Waweru, 2018; Waweru & Riro, 
2013), Vietnam (Khanh & Khuong, 2018), Nigeria (Obigbemi, Omolehinwa, Mukoro, Ben-Caleb, & Olusanmi, 
2016; Uwuigbe, 2017; Uwuigbes, Olubukunola, & Bernard, 2015), Kuwait (Arkan, 2015), Jordan (Abbadi, 
Hijazi, & Al-Rahahleh, 2016), Taiwan (Tai, 2017), Tanzania (Waweru, 2018), India (Kumasi & Pattanayak, 
2015; Shette, 2018) Turkey (Altintaş, Sari, & Otluoğlu, 2017), among others. 
Hence, we confirm that developing market of Eastern European countries needs further investigation. 
New research questions must be developed.  
Therefore, based on the previous literature, examining the environment of emerging Eastern European 
countries we may observe that economic policies vary from country to country because different countries 
                                                          
1See statistics: Eurostat database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), World Bank databank (http://data.worldbank.org), Doing business database 
(http://doingbusiness.org). 
Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 2019, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 59-81 
 
62 
have different national ideologies. Therefore, the present study extends the earnings management research. 
We take into consideration the changing and specific circumstances of developing European companies 
investigating environmental factors which influence on the managers’ decisions and may explain the 
differences in earnings management among different emerging Eastern European countries.  
 
3. Sample and Methodology  
3.1. Sample and Analysis Period 
Following research of Callao et al. (2017a) who focused on study of earnings management based on the 
evidence from the Eastern European companies, we use the same sample as used in their study. Their study 
confirmed that managers from emerging European companies manage earnings. Additionally, they found 
differences in earnings management among firms within different countries. Therefore, we extend their study 
providing empirical evidence on environmental factors which explain those differences in the extent of 
earnings management across countries. Therefore, the sample comprises a total of 4,627 non-financial firms 
from the emerging European countries: Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The analysis covers 
the period of 2002 to 20092. The AMADEUS database was used to generate the sample.  
Following Callao et al. (2017a) sample selection methodology, data were available for the variables 
considered for all the years included in the study (2003-2009) and for the prior period (2002) was used to 
calculate changes in certain variables. For each variable, outliers were eliminated3. Additionally, a sample 
comprises of the following number of listed companies of the Eastern European countries: 16 listed companies 
from the Czech Republic, 65 listed companies from Poland, 8 listed companies from Hungary, and 39 listed 
companies from Slovakia. Therefore, we may confirm that research includes mainly non-listed companies, as 
financial sectors in Eastern European countries is still relatively unfavourable and underdeveloped (Köke & 
Schröder, 2006).  
We work with non-consolidated financial statements prepared under local GAAP. The sample selection 
was restricted by data base limitation. Data of financial statement prepared under IFRS was available only for 
small number of companies, listed companies4. The final sample is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table-1. Sample selection procedure. 
 No. of companies Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia Total 
Total number of firms available in 
Amadeus data base 
3,006 2,609 183 398 6,196 
Incomplete data (missing data) (779) (208) (62) (163) (1,212) 
Extreme values (178) (150) (7) (22) (357) 
Total sample firms 2,049 2,251 114 213 4,627 
Number of observations 14,343 15,757 798 1,491 32,389 
            Source: Callao et al. (2017a). 
 
3.2. Methodology  
First, based on the large earnings management literature we identify variables which may give 
explanation of existent differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries. We predict 
the sign of the coefficients of the variables. 
Second, we use a regression model to examine the influence of each of the independent variables on 
changes in the scope of earnings management between Eastern European countries.  
 
3.2.1. Variables Definition and Predicted Sign of the Coefficients of the Variables 
In the literature we may find at least three main research designs for detecting earnings management: 
those based on aggregate accruals, those based on specific accruals and those based on the distribution of 
earnings after management (McNichols, 2000). We use aggregated accruals, specifically the discretionary part 
of the accruals in relation to the total accrual. Accruals are the part of revenues and expenses that do not imply 
collections and payments, and they are defined as the difference between profit and operating cash flows. Due 
to the lack of data for operating cash flow for many of the companies in the sample, we calculate total accruals 
(TA) according to Equation 1:  
ititititit DEPPayablessInventorieceivablesTA  Re   (1) 
where, ∆Receivables is the change in accounts receivable, ∆Inventories is the change in inventories, 
∆Payables is the change in accounts payable and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. The 
                                                          
2 In addition, we have not included more years into the research, as emerging Eastern European countries are not widely presented with full data in Amadeus 
database, and we wanted to see further implications related to Callao et al. (2017a) study.   
3 Outliers, observations those falling outside the range set by the mean value plus/minus three times the standard deviation.  
4 Different studies examining developing countries confirm that introduction of IFRS does not necessarily influence on earnings management by private 
companies (see studies, (Doukakis, 2014; Hasan & Rahman, 2017; Kersten, 2011). 
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subscripts i and t refer to the firm and the year respectively. Changes are calculated with respect to the prior 
year. 
However, not all accruals are equally capable of being manipulated, and we may, therefore, distinguish 
between non-discretionary accruals (NDA), which are more difficult to manage, and discretionary accruals, 
which are easier. Thus, TA = NDA + DA.  
The discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals are not directly observable (Jones, 1991) 
consequently, we used model employed by Yoon and Miller (2002) in cross sectional version to estimate the 
DA. Previous studies verified the importance of the selection of the appropriate model for the measuring 
earnings management for the each environment (Bartov & Gul, 2000; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; 
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Siregar & Utama, 2008). The success of any earnings management study 
critically depends on the precise methodology used to measure it (Callao et al., 2017c). 
Callao et al. (2017c) confirmed that the cross-sectional model by Yoon and Miller (2002) (1) is an effective 
model for our Eastern European countries in detecting earnings management: higher level of adjusted R 
square, lower level of standard error, and more significant values of the parameters Table 2 shows results on 
adjusted R²)5. Therefore, we used this model to estimate discretionary accruals.    
it
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             (2) 
where, itTA is total accruals in year t booked by firm i in period t; itREV  is the change in net sales 
revenue; itREC  is the change in receivable accounts; itEXP  is the change in operating expenses 
excluding non-cash expenses; itPAY is the change in payables; 1itNCASH is previous period non-cash 
expenses, such as depreciation; itGPPEGRW  is a rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment; 
1itA is total assets from the previous period and is used as a deflator to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity, 
it  is the error term.  
Moreover, in the lineal regression model the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals because we want to measure the magnitude of manipulation without regard to its sign.  
 
Table-2. Mean values of adjusted R² by models and across the countries’ samples. 
Measurement model Sample countries  
Mean value of R² 
The Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Mean 
Jones (1991) 0.0947 0.0666 0.0890 0.0996 0.0875 
Dechow et al. (1995) 0.0452 0.0617 0.0511 0.0806 0.0597 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) 0.0973 0.0796 0.0821 0.0900 0.0872 
Shivakumar (1996) 0.0995 0.1449 0.1200 0.0953 0.1149 
Key (1997) 0.0957 0.0705 0.0796 0.0906 0.0841 
Teoh et al. (1998) 0.0120 0.0287 0.0192 -0.0060 0.0135 
Kasznik (1999) 0.0953 0.1423 0.1177 0.1106 0.1165 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 0.3490 0.3733 0.3500 0.4292 0.3754 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) 0.0668 0.0848 0.0800 0.1079 0.0849 
Kothari et al. (2005) 0.0405 0.0661 0.0599 0.0910 0.0644 
          Source: Callao et al. (2017c). 
 
Having estimated the parameters of Equation 1, we applied the values obtained to predict discretionary 
accruals for the 2003–2009 study periods. The prediction error is interpreted as the discretionary part of 
accruals, defined in Equation 2: 
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where, itDA  are discretionary accruals for firm i in period t, and 0a , 1a , 2a  and 3a  are the estimated 
values of αi. To explain the dependent variable we include the following independent variables Table 3.  
Selection of the variables is based on previous earnings management literature, as well as on the particular 
characteristics of the environment of the emerging Eastern European countries. Investor protection (Investor) 
                                                          
5 For details of levels of standard error, significance values of the parameters see research paper of Callao et al. (2017c). 
Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 2019, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 59-81 
 
64 
is the first variable considered. We investigate the relationship between country-level investor protection and 
earnings management. Literature confirms that investor protection has an important effect on earnings 
management. We measure it as an index of investor protection. Previous literature, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) identified this variable as outside investor 
rights. They measured it as an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights. It ranged from 0 to 5, where 
five designated strong investor rights. Nevertheless, their studies were constructed only for Western 
European countries, and they used data from 1990 to 1999, which are not current for our investigation.  
 
Table-3. Variables definition and predicted sign of the coefficients of the independent variables. 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
Dependent variable: 
DA  Absolute value of discretionary accruals  
Independent variables: 
Investor 
Index of investor protection. 
The index is constructed based on the Leuz et al. (2003); Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and Doing 
Business database (2012). It ranges values from 0 to 10. 
– 
Listedtomean 
Number of listed companies in each country to the mean of total 
listed companies in all four Eastern European countries. 
t
t
Nrlisted
Mean4Country
 
– 
Marketcapit 
The market capitalization to gross domestic product of each 
country sample.  
t
t
MarketCapit
GDP
 
– 
Strengthrights 
Index of legal rights. 
The index is constructed based on the Doing Business database 
(2012). It ranges values from 0 to 10. 
– 
Accountax 
Accounting and tax connection variable. A dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the firm-year observation is Hungary or Slovakia; 0 
for Poland and Czech.  
+ 
Foreigninvest 
A value of net inflows in each country to the gross domestic 
product of the country.  
t
t
ForeignInvest
GDP
 – 
Ownership 
The number of recorded major shareholders in each company to 
the mean of the number of shareholders within each sample 
country. 
 t
t
NrShareholders
MeanNrSharehCountry
 
? 
Board 
Number of boards’ members in each company to the mean of 
members within each sample country. 
 
t
t
NrBoard
MeanNrBoardCountry
  ? 
Legalenforc 
Index of legal enforcement. 
The index is constructed based on three databases: World 
Economic Forum database (2012); World Justice Project database 
(2012); and Transparency International (TI) (2012). It ranges 
values from 0 to 10. 
– 
Years 
Number of years of each company to the mean age of firms in each 
country. 
 t
t
NrYears
MeanNrYearsCountry
  ? 
Control variables: 
Size 
Total assets scaled by assets from t-1 
t
t-1
Assets
Assets
  
Listed 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is listed and 0 
otherwise  
 
Industry 
Nine dummy variables according to one digit SIC code, it takes 
values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), 
otherwise 0, industry classification is described in Table 2. 
 
   * where t is a period from 2003 to 2009. 
      Source: The author.  
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Therefore, we construct our investor protection index based on the dimensions of investor protection 
proposed by the above authors. The indicator distinguishes three dimensions of investor protections: 
transparency of related-party transactions6, liability for self-dealing7 (called by the literature as extent of 
director liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct8 (ease of 
shareholder suits index). All three dimensions range from 0 to 10, where the 0 indicates no transparency, no 
liability for self-dealing, no shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. On the other 
hand, the value 10 indicates perfect transparency, liability for self-dealing and ideal shareholders’ ability to sue 
officers and directors for misconduct.  
To obtain the values of the index, we follow the study of Djankov et al. (2008) and the Doingbusiness 
database (www.doingbusiness.org, 2012). Thus, we obtain the index, see Table 4. 
 
Table-4. Investor protection index. 
Sample 
countries 
Transparency of 
related-party 
transactions 
(index 0-10) 
Liability for 
self-dealing 
(index 0-10) 
Shareholders’ ability to 
sue officers and directors 
for misconduct 
(index (0-10) 
Strength of 
investor 
protection 
(index 0-10) 
Czech Republic 2 5 8 5.0 
Poland 7 2 9 6.0 
Hungary 2 4 7 4.3 
Slovakia 3 4 7 4.7 
Source: The author based on: Leuz et al. (2003); Djankov et al. (2008), Doing business (www.doingbusiness.org, 2012). 
 
Consequently, we define investor protection as the power to prevent managers from expropriating 
minority shareholders and creditors within the constraints imposed by law (see (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003)).  
Ample literature confirms that weak legal protection appears to result in poor-quality financial reporting, 
and in consequence leads to increase in earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). Nenova (2003) indicate that 
earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of outside investors is weak, 
because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and hence they have stronger 
incentives to obfuscate firm performance. 
 La Porta et al. (1998) point out that strong investor protection may be a particularly important 
manifestation of the greater security of property rights against political interference. Shen and Chih (2005) 
show, as well, that earnings management declines in countries with stronger investor protection and more 
transparent accounting disclosure.  
Therefore, according to prior literature we expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. 
Companies in countries with high investor protection will use less earnings management compared to similar 
companies in countries with lower investor protection due to stricter regulations. 
We include the (Listedtomean) variable. It designates the development of the capital market in each of our 
sample countries. It is measured as a relation of the number of listed companies in each country to the mean of 
total listed companies in Eastern European countries.  
We include the variable because the literature shows that capital market efficiency indeed affects earnings 
management of firms. Cheng and Hsueh (2012) find that a stable capital market keeps managers allocating 
resources, while at the same time reducing opportunities and managers’ motivation to manipulate earnings.  
Eastern European countries capital market is quite small compared to Western European countries. 
However, they are considerably growing. This is due to positive impulses from the European Union 
membership, globalization, market liberalization, etc. Nevertheless, Eastern European countries need still to 
develop their capital markets. 
 By introducing this variable we attempt to answer if the role of capital markets in the new market 
economies of each of our Eastern European countries has an important influence on managers’ decisions. 
Alternatively, will the development of capital markets encourage managers of enterprises to undertake 
earnings management? According to the literature, we expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. 
In countries with better developed markets firms will engage less in earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). 
                                                          
6 This variable has the following dimensions: whether the corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for the transaction; whether immediate 
disclosure of the transaction to the public is presented; whether disclosure in the annual report is required; whether disclosure to the board of directors or the 
supervisory board is required; whether it is required that an external body, for example, an external auditor, review the transaction before it takes place.  
7 This variable has the following dimensions: whether a shareholder applicant is able to hold liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the 
company; whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold the approving body (the CEO, members of the board of directors, or members of the supervisory 
board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff; 
whether damages are paid for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; whether shareholder plaintiffs are able to 
sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company. 
8 This variable has the following dimensions: what range of documents is available to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial; 
whether the plaintiff can directly examine the defendant and witnesses during trial; whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of relevant documents from the 
defendant without identifying each document specifically; whether shareholders owning 10% or less of the company’s share capital can request that a 
government inspector investigate the Buyer-Seller transaction without filing suit in court; whether shareholders owning 10% or less of the company’s share 
capital have the right to inspect the transaction documents before filing suit; whether the standard of proof for civil suits is lower than that for a criminal case. 
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We also consider market capitalization variable (Marketcapit). This variable is measured as market 
capitalization to the gross domestic product of each country sample. Direct comparisons between the 
emerging markets of developing countries over years may help to compare the environment in which 
companies are operating.  
Although the value of a business does not change immediately, it can be interesting to observe the effect 
of growth of country markets. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the market capitalization of Eastern 
European countries. We may observe slight differences between countries; hence, we are interested in whether 
these changes may influence the differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries.  
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Figure-1. Market capitalization index over years in Eastern European countries (relation of market value to gross domestic product). 
Source: Doing business database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
 
Companies highly depend on the development and conditions of country market capitalization. Kothari, 
Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2012) explain that managers are expected to exercise their judgment to determine 
the best course of action given the economic circumstances. This provides managers incentives to engage in 
earnings management activities. 
 Companies operating in better market conditions tend to have more assets, capital and higher revenues 
than those with lesser market capitalization (Hamel, 2013). This is because countries’ market development 
improves the climate for capital inflows by pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, better business 
environments, and stronger institutional and economic fundamentals (Torre & Schmukler, 2006). Firms in 
countries with higher levels of capitalization are frequently better organized in terms of financial condition. It 
is also expected that a positive environment may help them to be more stable and solid companies, and in 
consequence, they will manage their earnings less.  
Hence, we expect that companies operating in highly developed and capitalized countries’ markets 
manage their earnings (it to increase or decrease earnings), as a country’s environment creates more 
opportunities to have a competitive advantage. Therefore, companies have less incentives for earnings 
management (negative predicted sign).  
The strength of legal rights of lenders is another variable considered in our model (Strengthrights). We 
measure the strength of rights based on the index proposed by business database Doingbusiness 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). The index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 10, 
with higher scores indicating stronger legal rights. Table 5 presents the index values for Eastern European 
countries. 
 
Table-5. Index of strength of legal rights. 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 
Poland 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
Hungary 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Slovakia 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
            Source: Doing business database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
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We include this variable because, as explained Djankov, Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007) less developed 
countries, with poorly functioning legal systems, might be unable to sustain an effective lending channel based 
on ex-post creditor rights. They may depend on information sharing for their credit markets to function. In 
contrast, richer countries might develop more functional systems of bankruptcy, so that lender power can be 
particularly important in these countries (Djankov et al., 2007) and in effect a lower level of earnings 
management may be observed.  
Eastern European countries are still less developed in the ongoing process of growth. This is because, 
countries with a higher degree of creditor and lender protection can be expected to enjoy deeper debt markets 
since they can take advantage of mitigated problems derived from information asymmetries, reduced market 
instability and reduced financial constraints (Galindo & Micco, 2003) including reduced incentives for 
earnings management.  
Although previous studies have barely analyzed the influence of creditor rights on earnings management 
we predict a negative coefficient. This means that the better legal rights of lenders, the less earnings 
management is expected. The predicted sign is also according to the study of Fonseca and González (2008) 
who assumed stronger creditor rights would reduce incentives to manage earnings.  
The accounting and tax connection variable (Accountax) is a variable which explains the connection of the 
accounting practice and tax requirements. Authors explained that it is reasonable to believe that the tax 
environment in which a firm is involved, is a strong stimulus for discretionary judgment by managers in 
financial statements (e.g. (Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2009; Beatty & Harris, 1998; Chen & Daley, 
1996).  
The trend (and need) toward international accounting homogenization has been increasingly recognized 
(Goldberg et al., 2006) however, the behaviour of accounting measures across countries is still quite dissimilar 
because of differences in business or tax regulations (Biscarri & Espinosa, 2007). Therefore, include the 
variable.  
Moreover, earnings management studies point out that if accounting practice in the country is strongly 
aligned with tax practice a higher level of earnings management is expected in firms from this country, as 
managers try to meet the tax requirements according to companies’ objectives. In contrast, in countries where 
tax regulation does not influence financial reporting, earnings management is lower (see for example studies of 
(Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Caramanis & Lennox, 2008; Coppensa & Peek, 2005; Herrmann & Inoue, 
1996; Muramiya & Takada, 2010). 
Additionally, literature on earnings management points out that within the Eastern European countries 
Poland and the Czech Republic represent countries with a perspective focused to some extent on “investor 
oriented” directives having slight flexibility in terms of the fulfilment of the tax requirements, (see studies, 
(Jaruga, Walinska, & Baniewicz, 1996; Mackevicius, Strouhal, & Zverovich, 2008; Sucher & Jindrichovska, 
2004; Vellam, 2004). On the other hand, Slovakia and Hungary are much more orientated towards the strong 
and strict connection of the accounting and taxation system.  
Therefore, we measure our variable as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm-year 
observation is from countries with strongly aligned tax practice (Hungary or Slovakia); 0 for Poland and 
Czech. We expect a positive relationship between accounting and tax connection variable and earnings 
management. This means that the higher tax connection between the accounting practice and tax 
requirements, the higher the level of predicted earnings manipulation. 
The foreign investment variable (FOREIGNINVEST) specifies a positive symptom of foreign investments 
in a country and influences on managers’ decisions regarding earnings management.  We measure the variable 
as a value of net inflows of foreign investment into a country to the gross domestic product.  
Guo, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou (2014) identify foreign investments as a factor in controlling earnings 
management. Foreign investments bring investors and improve economic growth, as well as raising the level 
of accounting information. Errunza (2001) and Hunter (2005) show, as well, that indirect barriers may arise 
from different elements (available information, accounting standards, investor protection), including 
differences in foreign investments, which may result in further information asymmetry and in effect in 
earnings manipulation. 
Figure 2 shows mean values of foreign investments over the period of 2003-2009 indicating important 
differences in terms of inflows of foreign investments for different emerging Eastern European countries. We 
expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable as the higher foreign investment, the lower manipulation 
is expected. 
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Figure-2. Foreign investments of Eastern European countries (mean values over 2003-2009 in $). 
                        Source: Doingbusiness database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
 
We also introduce the ownership variable (Ownership). In order to examine the ownership structure of 
Eastern European firms, we focus on the number of major shareholders9 for each of our sample countries, as 
provided in the Amadeus database. In particular we define the variable in a number of recorded major 
shareholders in firms to mean number of recorded major shareholders in firms within each country sample. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Roodposhti and S. (2011) explain that ownership concentration can be 
measured as the existence and number of shareholders in firms and in effect their influence on managers’ 
decisions.  
Earnings management literature considers ownership structure as an important managers’ monitoring 
mechanism. They may have a monitoring role in constraining the existence of earnings management. Extent 
literature suggests two different views in relation to the expectation for firms in terms of ownership 
concentration.  
On one side, some studies suggest that ownership concentration is negatively related to earnings 
management. This indicates that higher ownership concentration improves the quality of managerial 
decisions. This is because the presence of a small number of holders leads to closer monitoring of management, 
implying less opportunity for earnings manipulation. Managers of firms that are highly concentrated tend to 
be highly monitored (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Dempsey, Hunt, & Schroeder, 1993; Jiambalvo, 1996; 
Yeo, Tan, Ho, & Chen, 2002).   
However, other studies document evidence suggesting that ownership concentration may actually induce 
earnings management (e.g. (Abdoli, 2011; Djankov et al., 2008; Leuz et al., 2003; Morck, Scheifer, & Vishny, 
1998; Wang, Xu, & Zhu, 2001).  
Large shareholders have the capacity to pressure managers to increment earnings manipulation 
(increasing or decreasing earnings) so that their expected market value is obtained. Moreover, it is also 
observed a pursuing their own interest rather than the company’s, among other reasons.  
As a consequence, there is no consensus in terms of relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management, so we do not predict the sign of the coefficient of the variable. Moreover, we find that 
Eastern European countries show mostly very high ownership concentration (we measure it as a number of 
major shareholders’ members).  
This is because they are mostly small and medium size firms10. Additionally, we also identify that Eastern 
European countries slightly differ in terms of ownership concentration. Therefore, we include the variable to 
evaluate the impact of ownership concentration on the existence of differences in managing earnings among 
Eastern European firms. 
We include, as well, board variable (Board) to measure the impact of boards in constraining earnings 
management. We define the variable as the number of boards’ members in each company to the mean of 
members in each country. The effect of board composition has been tested in numerous studies, see for 
example Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Jones (1991); Beasley (1996); Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998); 
Klein (2002); Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat (2005). Nevertheless, literature pointed out several characteristics 
of boards of directors: board composition, board size, board ownership, or duality status of the chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer.  
                                                          
9 Major shareholder is defined as a person or entity that owns more than 5% of a company. The majority shareholder is often the founder of the company, or 
in the case of long-established businesses, the founder's descendants.  
10 Eastern European companies are characterized by small and medium companies (see for example, (Kaminska & Mularczyk, 2006; Sirák, Salner, & Druga, 
2004; Vanek, 2002). 
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In the complexity of the characteristics of the board of directors we focus on board size as a variable to 
measure the effectiveness in monitoring and constraining earnings management11. Previous empirical studies, 
for one side, indicate that smaller boards are commonly considered more effective monitors than larger boards. 
Alternately, other studies point out contrary results. 
A larger board may be able to draw from a broader range of experience, may have independent directors 
with corporate or financial experience, and might be better at preventing earnings management. 
Consequently, no prediction on the sign of the coefficient of the variable is made.  
The legal enforcement variable (Legalenforc) is included in order to test its impact on earnings 
management. We measure the variable using an index based on three legal variables: (1) the efficiency of the 
judicial system, (2) an assessment of the rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range 
from zero to ten, where 0 indicates weak and 10 indicates strong legal enforcement, see Table 6. 
 
Table-6. Legal enforcement index for Eastern European countries. 
Sample 
countries 
Rule of law 
index 
Legal efficiency 
system index 
Transparency 
index 
Legal enforcement index 
(mean of 3 variables) 
Czech Republic 7.1 4.1 4.4 5.2 
Poland 7.8 4.7 5.5 6.0 
Hungary 6.3 4.0 4.6 5.0 
Slovakia 7.0 3.4 4.0 4.8 
  Source: (World Economic Forum database, 2012).   (World Justice Project database, 2012).  Transparency International Index (www.transparency.org, 
2012).  
 
This index was first proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. (2003) (these are widely cited 
studies in terms of legal enforcement)12. To construct the legal enforcement index, we use three different 
databases. The efficiency of the judicial system variable (1) is obtained from the World Economic Forum 
database (http://www.weforum.org/, 2012). An assessment of the rule of law (2) is taken from the World 
Justice Project database (http://worldjusticeproject.org/, 2012). And finally, the corruption index (3) is based 
on the Transparency International Index (www.transparency.org, 2012). Thereby, we obtain the legal 
enforcement index.  
Literature points out that legal enforcement has positive impact on the quality of financial reporting, and 
on the reduction of earnings management (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 
2003; Rahman, 2000). A strong legal enforcement limits the ability of insiders to acquire private information 
that leads to a decrease in management incentives. It increases the earnings quality. Additionally, a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, might tempt auditors to compromise their independence and hence, neglect to 
constrain earnings management or issue a qualified opinion when necessary. Therefore, in line with previous 
studies we expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. Higher levels of legal enforcement will 
constrain earnings management incentives.  
We consider also the YEARS variable which designates the operating years of the company on the market 
(age of the firm). We measure the variable as the number of years of each firm to the mean age of firms in each 
sample country. We may observe in Figure 3 differences in age between Eastern European firms. Companies 
from Poland are almost twice as old as other Eastern European countries. Slovakian firms seem to be the 
youngest within our country sample firms, among other differences.  
 
 
Figure-3. Age of Eastern European firms (mean by country). 
                   Source: The author based on the Amadeus database. 
 
                                                          
11 Analyzing all of board’s characteristics is beyond the scope of our investigation and would not provide additional conclusions.  
12 Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1998) constructed their index only for Western European countries. They used data from 1990 to 1999.   
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According to the literature, there are rather mixed results in terms of predicted sign and age of the firm. 
On one side, younger and less experienced companies are more likely to manage more earnings, as their 
management and accounting systems become less established, they have limited resources or they are more 
likely to be liquidated due to their early stage of operating on the markets (Chiraz & Anis, 2013; Lee & 
Masulis, 2011).  
Consequently, they may decide to improve their earnings. On the other side, older firms are normally 
well-established; therefore they have more incentives and more opportunities to engage in earnings 
management activities to fulfil market expectations, or previously settled targets (Habbash & Xiao, 2014). 
Therefore, we have no prediction on the coefficient of the variable.  
Finally, we include three control variables: the size effect, being listed, and firm’s industry. Studies on 
earnings management points out the difference in the way of earnings management related to the firm size 
(SIZE), see studies of Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Young (1999), Dechow 
and Dichev (2002), Kim, Liu, and Rhee (2003), Othman and Zeghal (2006), Paiva and Costa (2013).  
There is empirical evidence that both large- and small-sized firms manage earnings. We measure the 
variable by the relation of the total assets in each company in each sample, by year scaled by total assets from 
t-1. 
We also include LISTED variable. The LISTED variable represents firms listed on the Czech, Polish, 
Hungarian, or Slovakian Stock Exchanges. Studies confirm that listed and non-listed companies differ in 
managing earnings, see studies of Fama and Jensen (1983), Rangan (1998), Erickson and Wang (1999), Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler et al. (2006), Skarda (2010) among others. We measure it as a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the company is listed and 0 if not.  
Finally, we include the INDUSTRY variable. Literature indicates that firm’s industry influences on 
earnings management. A firm operating within one industry may manage earnings distinctly from one 
operating in another. (see for example, (Beneish, 2001; Callao & Jarne, 2011; Godfrey & Koh, 2001; Palepu, 
Healy, Bernard, Wright, & Lee, 2004; Verrecchia, 1983; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986)).  
Following, we measure firm’s industry as a multiple dummy variable (nine dummies), which receives 1 if 
the company belongs to a certain industry (Nr=1, …,9), otherwise 013.  
 
3.2.2. Model Specification 
We estimate the coefficients of the variables by maximum likelihood using an ordinary least squares 
regression. The model is as follows:   
0 1 2 3it t tDA INVESTOR LISTEDTOMEAN MARKETCAPIT       
4 5 6 tSTRENGTHRIGHTS ACCOUNTAX FOREIGNINVEST     
itititit SIZEYEARSCLEGALENFORBOARDOWNERSHIP 1110987  
92111312 ... INDUSTRYINDUSTRYLISTED     (3) 
DA , is an absolute value of discretionary accruals of the firms; INVESTOR is an index of investor 
protection; 
tLISTEDTOMEAN is the number of listed companies in each country to the mean of total listed 
companies in all four Eastern European countries; 
tMARKETCAPIT  is the market capitalization to the gross 
domestic product of each country; STRENGTHRIGHTS is an index which measures the strength of legal 
rights of lenders; ACCOUNTAX is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm observation is from Hungary 
or Slovakia, 0 otherwise; 
tFOREIGNINVEST  is the relation between the value of net inflows in each country 
to the gross domestic product; 
itOWNERSHIP  is the number of major shareholders in each company to the 
mean within each sample country; 
itBOARD  is defined as the number of board members in each company to 
the mean within each sample country; LEGALENFORC is an index of legal enforcement; itYEARS is the age 
of the company to the mean of age of the firms in each sample country; 
itSIZE  is a total assets scaled by assets 
from t-1; i  is firm observation; t is a period of 2003 … 2009; LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a 
listed company, 0 otherwise; 
1...9INDUSTRY  represents nine dummy variables according to one digit SIC 
code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0. 
                                                          
13 According to SIC-code, industries: 1 - agriculture, forestry and fishing industries; 2 - manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry; 3 - 
construction; 4 - wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities; 5 - information and communication 
industry; 6 - financial and insurance activities; 7 - real estate activities; 8 - professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities; 9 - 
public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities; 0 - other services (group “other” comprises establishments engaged in 
providing services not specifically in previous category of public services, for example, Hunting, trapping and related service activities; Marine services). 
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 7 provides the results of regression. The adjusted R² of the model is at 13.1% level. This is a good 
result in terms of discretionary accruals models. F-test, as well, confirms that the model is significant 
(F=234.457). We may observe that coefficients on two of our variables: Strengthrights variable and Listedtomean 
variable are not significant.  
This indicates that the degree of creditor and lender protection in emerging Eastern European firms is 
not significantly related to earnings management and does not explain the differences among Eastern 
European countries in terms of managers’ decisions regarding earnings management.  
At the same time we also do not find a significant relationship between the development of capital markets 
of Eastern European countries (number of listed companies) and differences in terms of earnings manipulation 
among countries. Other variables show significant coefficients at 1% (most of the variables) and at 10% (one 
variable). Consequently, we present the influence of each independent variable on the existent differences in 
managing earnings among developing Eastern European countries.  
 
4.1. Investor Protection (Investor) 
The investor protection variable has a significant at 5% negative coefficient (-0.033) consistent with our 
prediction. This confirms that investor protection is becoming an important aspect in explaining the 
differences in the scope of earnings management among Eastern European countries, as we have observed 
important variations in the level of investor protection between countries.  
Additionally, the negative sign indicates that stronger investor protection leads managers to decrease 
earnings management. We observe that the highest value of index of investor protection is in Poland, followed 
by the Czech Republic and the lowest in Hungary and Slovakia. At the same time, Callao et al. (2017c) confirm 
that the highest earnings manipulation within emerging Eastern European countries is observed in Hungary 
than in Slovakia, following by the Czech Republic.  
The lowest earnings manipulation is observed in Poland, see Annex 1. Hence, our results are consistent 
indicating that investor protection represents an important tool for limiting managing earnings in companies. 
Other studies also confirm that there is considerable variation in the legal regimes across countries. La Porta 
et al. (1998) found that certain countries afford greater investor protection than others. Ball et al. (2000) 
confirm that better investor protection improves the informativeness of reported earnings. Consequently, 
firms from countries with stronger investor protection show less evidence of earnings management because all 
the financial information is published and well-known.  
 
Table-7. Results of ordinary least square regression. 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients t Significance 
 B Std. error Beta 
(Constant) -.112 .023  -4.978 .000 
Investor -.033 .010 -.148 -3.272 .001 
Listedtomean -.001 .002 -.006 -.406 .685 
Marketcapit -.054 .007 -.046 -7.233 .000 
Strengthrights -.003 .002 -.017 -1.406 .160 
Accountax .008 .005 .017 1.767 .077 
Foreigninvest -.070 .018 -.025 -3.922 .000 
Ownership .004 .001 .030 5.655 .000 
Board -.005 .001 -.023 -4.264 .000 
Legalenforc .054 .011 .192 4.799 .000 
Years -.002 .001 -.018 -3.332 .001 
Size .102 .002 .345 65.710 .000 
Listed .013 .006 .013 2.391 .017 
Industry1 .008 .004 .019 2.061 .039 
Industry2 .011 .003 .039 3.303 .001 
Industry3 .001 .004 .003 .393 .694 
Industry4 .025 .003 .097 7.454 .000 
Industry5 .010 .005 .013 2.003 .045 
Industry6 -.007 .004 -.014 -1.793 .073 
Industry7 .023 .005 .035 5.029 .000 
Industry8 -.002 .004 -.004 -.422 .673 
Industry9 .047 .008 .035 6.112 .000 
Adjusted R² 0.131 
F-value 234.457* 
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GHTSSTRENGTHRITMARKETCAPIANLISTEDTOMEINVESTORDA ttit 43210  
 ititt BOARDOWNERSHIPESTFOREIGNINVACCOUNTAX 8765 
 LISTEDSIZEYEARSCLEGALENFOR itit 1211109  921113 ... INDUSTRYINDUSTRY    
INVESTOR is an index of investor protection; tLISTEDTOMEAN is the number of listed companies to the mean of listed 
companies in all Eastern European countries; 
tMARKETCAPIT  is market capitalization of each country to the gross domestic 
product of each country; STRENGTHRIGHTS is an index of strength of legal rights of lenders; ACCOUNTAX is 
a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm observation is from Hungary or Slovakia, 0 otherwise; 
tFOREIGNINVEST  is the 
relation of value of net inflows of each country to the gross domestic product; 
itOWNERSHIP  is the number of major shareholders 
in each company to the mean within each sample country; 
itBOARD  is the number of board members in each company to the mean 
within each sample country; LEGALENFORC is an index of legal enforcement; 
itYEARS  is a age of the company to the 
mean of age of th firms in each sample country; 
itSIZE  is a total assets scaled by assets from t-1; i  is firm observation; t is a period of 
2003 … 2009; LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 0 otherwise. 
1...9INDUSTRY  variable 
represents nine dummy variable according to one digit SIC code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), 
otherwise 0. 
*Significant at 1% 
               Source: The author. 
 
 
4.2. Market Capitalization Variable (Marketcapit) 
The market capitalization variable has a significant negative coefficient (-0.054). This is in accordance 
with our prediction. The previously observed evolution of market capitalization of Eastern European countries 
confirmed our expectation.  
The singularity of capitalization of each of the Eastern European markets has an impact on the changes in 
the scope of earnings management. Companies operating in highly developed and capitalized countries’ 
markets manage their earnings less, as a country’s environment creates more opportunities to have a 
competitive advantage for doing business and limit earnings management possibilities. A better level of 
market capitalization improves the environment for capital inflows by pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, 
better business environments, and stronger institutional and economic fundamentals (Torre & Schmukler, 
2006) thereby reducing managers’ earnings management activities.  
Among our four Eastern European countries, Poland and the Czech Republic present higher market 
capitalization Figure 1 and at the same time they present lower earnings manipulation in comparison to our 
other two Eastern European countries: Hungary and Slovakia (Annex 1).  
Therefore, the results confirm that firms operating in different market capitalization environments have 
different access to assets, and capital. The higher level of market capitalization secures more resources for 
companies to limit earning management. 
 
4.3. Accounting and Tax Connection Variable (Accountax) 
The accounting and tax connection variables show significant at 10% positive coefficient (0.008). This is 
according to our prediction. A tax-driven nature of accounting requirements persists in Eastern European 
countries (Mackevicius et al., 2008). It comes from the historic development of the relationship between 
taxation and accounting. Until the 1990s there was an absence of specific accounting legislation. The tax law 
arbitrated without regard to either accounting theory or existing accounting practices (Fortin, 1991; 
Frydlender & Pham, 1996).  
Nowadays, even though the trend toward international accounting homogenization has been increasingly 
recognized in Eastern European countries (see, for example, (Goldberg et al., 2006)) the tax environment still 
remains as an important stimulus for discretionary judgment by managers (Badertscher et al., 2009; Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009) of Eastern European firms. 
Additionally, the accounting and financial directives among Eastern European countries are still quite 
dissimilar which result in different accounting and tax regulations. Among Eastern European countries we 
may find countries where accounting and tax practice are highly aligned (Slovakia and Hungary), and on the 
other hand, there are countries, despite the important tax and accounting connection, focusing their normative 
more on the investor perspective (Poland and the Czech Republic) (see, (Jaruga et al., 1996; Sucher & 
Jindrichovska, 2004; Vellam, 2004)).  
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Therefore, our results confirm that tax requirements are important factors of the Eastern European 
environment which have an impact on firms’ decisions for earnings management and explain the existent 
differences in earnings management among emerging Eastern European countries.   
 
4.4. Foreign Investment Variable (Foreigninvest) 
The coefficient on foreign investment variable (-0.070) is negative and significant. We have previously 
indicated significant differences among Eastern European countries in terms of the values of foreign 
investments. These differences within Eastern European countries indeed influence on managers’ decisions for 
managing earnings.  
Our results are also in accordance with the literature. Earnings management studies indicate that foreign 
investment is a factor in controlling earnings management (Guo et al., 2014). Foreign investors tend to invest 
in countries with high disclosure accounting quality (Leuz, Lins, & Warnock, 2009), attracting by well-
governed firms (Errunza, 2001) and where high transparency is observed (Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki, 
2005). 
In particular, it is highly important for Eastern European companies, where a range of circumstances such 
as: continuing transformation into the market and investor-oriented perspective, recent European Union 
membership, positive changes in the accounting normative, among others, bring important impulses for 
optimistic foreign investment inflows, and in consequence, give companies a new constructive and beneficial 
background. Therefore, we may affirm that foreign investment is indeed a relevant factor in terms of 
explaining the existent differences in the scope of earnings management among Eastern European countries. 
 
4.5. Ownership Variable (Ownership) 
The ownership variable shows positive and significant coefficient (0.004). It indicates that ownership 
concentration explains the existent differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries, 
as the structure of ownership in firms differs among Eastern European countries.  
Positive sign of the coefficient of the variable indicates the higher ownership concentration, the earnings 
management is reduced. It is explained by the capacity of the ownership to pressure managers to improve 
earnings quality and limit earnings management (Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2009) to improve control in the 
company and restrain earnings manipulation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and to minimize the use of private 
information by the managers (Jaggi & Tsui, 2007) and offer high transparency of the accounting numbers.  
 
4.6. Board Variable (Board) 
The board size variable presents significant at 1% value of coefficient (-0.005) indicating that board 
composition explain differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries. Emerging 
European countries present diverse composition of boards resulting in dissimilar countries’ environment and 
companies’ circumstances, and in consequence, it is affecting earnings manipulation activity. Additionally, 
negative sign of the coefficient shows that when larger number of board members is observed, the lower 
earnings management is than expected.  
Xie, Davidson, and Da Dalt (2003) confirm that a larger board is associated with lower levels of 
discretionary current accruals, indicating that a larger board is more effective in monitoring accruals than a 
smaller one. Moreover, Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) document that a larger board provides 
better environmental links. Finally, Xie et al. (2003) support that larger boards have a broader range of 
experience, so they are better in preventing earnings management. Therefore, our results are consistent with 
the literature. 
 
4.7. Legal Enforcement Variable (Legalenforc) 
Coefficient on legal enforcement is significant at 1%. Our results confirm that legal enforcement has an 
impact on the existent differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries (significant 
variable) as all four Eastern European countries show different levels of legal protection. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient presents the contrary sign to our prediction.  
A positive relationship is observed (0.054). This is due to the legal enforcement that is not developed 
sufficiently in Eastern European countries, or at least it is not as effective as it should be. Hence, we do not 
observe the expected negative influence on the scope of earnings management. 
 Hope (2003) points out that in the absence or underdevelopment of adequate legal enforcement, even the 
best accounting standards will be insufficient to improve the quality of accounting information (and in effect to 
constrain earnings management).  
Another possible explanation may come from the fact that in Eastern European countries there are 
mechanisms to secure effective legal enforcement; nevertheless, in practice one does not perceive these 
measures, as the results indicate that legal enforcement does not prevent earnings management in Eastern 
European firms. 
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 Literature assures that efficient legal enforcement instruments can improve the quality of accounting 
information (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). However, it seems that in the daily activities of Eastern 
European firms legal enforcement is far from adequate to improve financial information.  
 
4.8. Age of Firm (Years)  
Years variable presents negative (-0.002) significant at 5% coefficient. It shows that younger and less 
experienced companies are more likely to manage earnings. We observe that Eastern European countries 
differentiate in terms of age. We observe the higher age of Polish firms, followed by those of the Czech 
Republic, then Hungarian and Slovakian companies. At the same time, literature confirms that within the 
emerging Eastern European countries, companies from Slovakia and Hungary manage more earnings then 
firms from Poland and the Czech Republic (Annex 1).  
In consequence, we must consider the age of companies when explaining the existent difference in 
earnings management among Eastern European countries.  
Additionally, we observe that younger companies manipulate more their earnings. The literature provides 
important reasons to explain such activity of managers.  
On one side, the management and accounting systems of younger companies become less established so it 
is easier to manage earnings. Younger firms have limited resources. They are more likely to be liquidated due 
to their early stage of operating on the markets. Therefore, younger firms may decide to improve their 
earnings (Chiraz & Anis, 2013; Fan, 2007; Lee & Masulis, 2011).  
On the other side, managers of older firms have weaker incentives to manage earnings because they are 
well-established and they know well markets opportunities. They have fewer needs to opt for earnings 
manipulation. They may achieve competitive advantage differently: using elaborated market strategies, using 
their experience of doing business, etc.  
Moreover, market pressure for quality information, does not pressure the managers of older firms to 
manage earnings. When managers approach the age of retirement, they became more risk averse (Gibbons & 
Murphy, 1992; Matta & Beamish, 2008) and consequently, they opt for less risky strategies.  
Finally, we explain three control variables: size, listed and industry variables.  
 
4.9. Size Variable (Size) 
Size variable shows positive (0.102) significant at 5% coefficient. Therefore, we may observe that company 
size plays an important role in determining differences in earnings management among Eastern European 
companies.  
Additionally, the sign of the coefficient of the variable indicates that managers of large firms are more 
likely to manage more earnings. Literature explains that big companies present more information asymmetries 
and managers can use this advantage to exacerbate earnings management for their own benefit (Mohd & 
Ahmed, 2005; Othman & Zeghal, 2006). Larger firms face higher political costs and hence they have stronger 
incentives to fulfil political expectations (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  
 
4.10. Listed Variable (Listed) 
The coefficient on LISTED variable is positive (0.013) and significant at 5%. It explains the difference in 
earnings management between listed and non-listed firms among different Eastern European countries. The 
positive sign indicates that listed Eastern European firms engage more in earnings management than non-
listed companies.  
The structures of the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovakian Stock Exchanges are different; therefore, 
this variable helps to explain the existent difference observed among Eastern European countries in earnings 
management.  
 
4.11. Industry Variable (Industry) 
Finally, difference within industry structures among different Eastern European countries also influences 
on the observed dissimilarity in earnings management among our developing countries. Companies that are 
operating in one industry in one of the Eastern European countries may show different earnings manipulation 
than companies operating in the same industry but in other Eastern European countries, as circumstances, and 
the sector background within the different countries are not the same. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Earnings management is well investigated. Nevertheless, markets of emerging European countries are 
still barely explored. The general background and characteristics of these countries indicate that the 
environment where the companies are operating is very complex. They are facing market-oriented transition. 
It is observed important influence of the process of privatization. Companies are characterized by the 
underdeveloped audit environment, low level of accounting transparency influenced by the tax requirements. 
It is perceived still important weight of the former communist heritage, among others factors. At the same 
time, taking into consideration the economic aspect, it is observed that emerging Eastern European countries 
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are still not at the same economic level as Western European countries. Nevertheless, they increasingly gain 
experience and importance on the European market. Their companies are already among the fastest-growing 
companies in the Europe. 
Besides, little earnings management literature found indicates that companies from emerging countries 
manipulate earnings and they do it differently. However, there is no comparative study based on the sample of 
emerging European countries comparing them in terms of the earnings management and explaining the 
environmental factors which influence on the earnings manipulation. Therefore, our study focus on four 
developing Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Our research 
question focuses on the environmental factors of the Eastern European countries, which have an influence on 
the existence difference in earnings management among countries.  
Our results identify a set of factors that explain why managers of companies from different developing 
Eastern European countries manipulate differently. We identified that there is not a sole reason affecting the 
managers’ decisions, but a significant number of environmental factors that influence Eastern European 
companies, such as:  
 Legal enforcement.  
 Investor protection.  
 Market capitalization.  
 Board structure. 
 Ownership structure.  
 The scope of foreign investments.  
 The accounting and tax connection.  
 Firms’ age. 
Complexity and multiplicity of elements create the panorama of each Eastern European countries’ 
environment. 
These environmental circumstances and characteristics of firms are different among Eastern European 
countries. There are different levels of investor protection, market development, ownership concentration, 
board size, inflows of foreign investment, etc., within Eastern European countries. We confirm that these 
differences have an important influence on managers’ decisions. Therefore, managers manage earnings 
differently. Table 8 presents the connection between the level of earnings management among Eastern 
European countries and the different factors involved. We may report that each of the elements influence in a 
particular way on the scope of earnings management. Some of them induce managers to manage more 
earnings. Other set of aspects may importantly limit managers’ decisions as regards earnings manipulation.  
As observed, on one side, we may observe that whether a firm’s environment offers more protection 
(stronger investor protection) or is characterized by a higher level of development (higher market 
capitalization, higher foreign investments) it helps limiting earnings management activities of managers. At 
the same time, the singularity of capitalization of each of the Eastern European markets, differences in foreign 
investments and differences in investor protection explain the existent differences in earnings manipulation 
among emerging European countries.  
Moreover, the accounting and financial directives among Eastern European countries are still quite 
dissimilar which result in different accounting and tax regulations. Whether accounting and tax are not as 
strongly aligned with market approach as it may be expected in former communist Eastern European 
countries, the earnings management is lower. Additionally, older Eastern European firms, with higher 
ownership concentration and larger boards, limit levels of earnings management.  
On the other hand, an Eastern European firm’s environment, which does not ensure a high level of 
protection (lower investor protection) or is characterized by a lower level of development (lower market 
capitalization, lower foreign investments), and is strongly aligned with tax requirements, may create 
circumstances in which managers may opt for more earnings management activities.  
Finally, legal enforcement is not sufficiently developed in Eastern European countries to improve the 
quality of financial reporting and limit the existence of earnings management. This is due to the legal 
enforcement is not as effective as it should be; or, in Eastern European countries there are mechanisms to 
secure effective legal enforcement; nevertheless, in practice one does not perceive these measures. It seems that 
in the daily activities of Eastern European firms legal enforcement is far from adequate to improve financial 
information. 
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Table-8. The connection between level of earnings management and the level of each of the factor ranked by countries. 
Earnings management14  
Lower manipulation                                  Higher 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
16092.93 16143.23 16769.69 17416.34 
Investor protection 
Higher invest. protec.                                  Lower 
Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary 
Market capitalization 
Higher  capitalization                                  Lower 
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
Accounting and tax connection 
Lower connection                                       Higher 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Foreign investment 
Higher foreign inv.                                      Lower 
Hungary Poland Czech R. Slovakia 
Ownership concentration 
Higher concentration                                   Lower 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Board size  
Bigger size                                                   Lower 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Legal enforcement  
Lower legal enforce.                                    Higher 
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
Age of the firms 
Older                                                         Younger 
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
 
Besides, these factors are interconnected and have their own respective impact. Therefore, to explain the 
reasons for existent differences observed in earnings management among Eastern European it is necessary to 
focus on factors and characteristics as a block of reasons and their mutual association rather than on one 
factor.  
A potential future line of research could include a comparative study of earnings management between 
Eastern and Western European countries. The issue of earnings management in Europe as a whole has so far 
remained unanswered. Future studies could also incorporate other developing countries to the analysis. Lastly, 
future research could be carried out based on consolidated financial statement of listed companies to compare 
the results with those obtained for separate financial statements. Moreover, it would allow us to test the effect 
of IFRS adoption on the quality of financial reporting.  
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Annex 1. Differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries. 
Test Sample countries Kruskal-Wallis results 
Chi-square  30.647*** 
 Czech R. 16092.93 
Mean Poland 16143.23 
Rank Hungary 16769.69 
 Slovakia 17416.34 
                                 Non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. 
                                          * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. 
               Source: The author based on the study of Callao et al. (2017a). 
 
